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A Note on the Balancedness and the Concavity of Highway
Games∗
Barış Çiftçi†, Peter Borm† and Herbert Hamers†
Abstract
A highway problem is determined by a connected graph which provides all potential
entry and exit vertices and all possible edges that can be constructed between vertices, a
cost function on the edges of the graph and a set of players, each in need of constructing
a connection between a specific entry and exit vertex. Mosquera and Zarzuelo (2006)
introduce highway problems and the corresponding cooperative cost games called high-
way games to address the problem of fair allocation of the construction costs in case the
underlying graph is a chain. In this note, we study the concavity and the balancedness
of highway games on more general graphs. A graph G is called highway-game concave if
for each highway problem in which G is the underlying graph the corresponding highway
game is concave. The main result of our study is that a graph is highway-game concave
if and only if it is weakly triangular. Moreover, we provide sufficient conditions on
highway problems defined on cyclic graphs such that the corresponding highway games
are balanced.
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1 Introduction
Mosquera and Zarzuelo (2006) address the problem of fair allocation of the construction
costs of a highway network. For this aim, they formally consider highway problems and
analyze the corresponding cooperative cost games called highway games. In a highway
problem, the possibilities regarding the construction of the highway network are determined
by a connected graph. The set of vertices of the graph represents the potential entry and
exit points and the edges in the graph represent the possible highway connections that
can be constructed. Each edge in the graph has an associated cost which in general will
depend on its length or the geographical properties that may affect the construction costs
of the highway. Each player in a highway problem has to establish a connection between
two vertices in the graph, i.e., between his entry and exit point. Given a highway problem,
a corresponding highway game is defined as a cooperative cost game which associates to
each coalition of players the total cost of the cheapest selection of edges in the graph which
connects the entry and exit point of every member of the coalition. Mosquera and Zarzuelo
(2006) restricted attention to highway problems in which the underlying graph is a chain.
In this setting, there is only one path between an entry and exit point.
In this note, we study highway problems which allow for more general graphs. In par-
ticular, these graphs may contain cycles and hence, there will exist multiple paths between
some entry and exit points. Note that, in this setting, a coalition of players can further
reduce the joint construction costs by an optimal coordination of paths to construct. That
is, the joint minimal cost of a coalition is now obtained as a result of solving a combinatorial
optimization problem. Concavity (and hence balancedness) is a straightforward result for
highway games induced by chain graphs. However, balancedness and concavity results are
not immediate even for the simplest generalization of highway problems on chain graphs to
cyclic graphs.
We start our analysis of highway games by investigating their concavity properties. A
cooperative cost game is called concave if it exhibits the property that the incentives to join
a coalition increases as the coalition becomes larger. We proceed as Herer and Penn (1995)
on traveling salesman problems and Granot et al. (1999) on Chinese postman problems,
and focus on the question for which class of graphs the corresponding games are always
concave. We define a graph to be highway game-concave (HG-concave), if for every player
set, for every choice of entry and exit points for the players and for every cost specification,
the corresponding highway game is concave. The main result of this note is that a graph is
HG-concave if and only if it is weakly triangular. Here, a graph is called weakly triangular
if it is weakly cyclic, i.e., every edge in the graph is contained in at most one cycle and,
moreover, if every cycle is a triangle, i.e., every cycle is composed of three edges.
We then investigate the core of the highway games. The core of a cost game is defined
as the set of cost allocations that are stable in the sense that no coalition of players can do
better by splitting off. A game with a nonempty core is called balanced. Highway games
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induced by chains and trees, that is the graphs which provide only one path between any two
vertices, are always balanced. However, highway games induced by graphs which allow for
multiple paths between vertices need not be balanced in general. In this note, we first focus
on highway problems defined on cycles and provide several sufficient conditions such that
the corresponding highway games are balanced. Finally, we prove that the same conditions
are also sufficient for the balancedness of highway games induced by weakly cyclic graphs.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls basic notions from cooperative
game theory and graph theory and formally introduces highway problems and highway
games. Section 3 presents the main result of the paper: the characterization of HG-concave
graphs. Section 4 presents our results regarding the balancedness of highway games on
weakly cyclic graphs. Section 5 concludes.
2 Highway Problems and Highway Games
In this section, we formally define highway problems and the corresponding cooperative
cost games, called highway games.
2.1 Preliminaries
A cooperative (cost) game is a pair (N, c), where N is a nonempty, finite set of players and
c is a mapping, c : 2N → R with c(∅) = 0. A coalition is a set of players S ⊂ N and N
is called the grand coalition. For any coalition S ⊂ N , c(S) is interpreted as the minimal
joint cost of coalition S. A game (N, c) is monotonic if c(S) ≥ c(T ) for every S, T ∈ 2N
with T ⊂ S and it is called subadditive if c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) for every S, T ∈ 2N
with T ∩ S = ∅. A game (N, c) is concave if c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S) ≤ c(T ∪ {i}) − c(T ) for
every i ∈ N and S, T ⊂ N\{i} with T ⊂ S. Equivalently, a game (N, c) is concave if
c(T ∪ S) + c(T ∩ S) ≤ c(T ) + c(S) for every S, T ⊂ N .
The core C(c) of a game (N, c) is defined as the set of efficient cost allocations for
which no coalition has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition, i.e., C(c) = {x ∈
RN |
∑
i∈N xi = c(N) and
∑
i∈S xi ≤ c(S) for all S ∈ 2
N}. A game with a nonempty core is
called balanced. In particular, concave games are balanced.
An (undirected) graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a nonempty and finite set of vertices
and E is a subset of all edges {i, j} with i, j ∈ V , i 6= j. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A
path in G between vertices i and j is a collection of edges {{i0, i1}, {i1, i2}, ..., {ik−1, ik}}
such that i0 = i, ik = j, {iq−1, iq} ∈ E for all q ∈ {1, ..., k} and all intermediate vertices
are distinct, i.e., iq 6= ir for all q, r ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} with q 6= r. A cycle in G is a path
from i to i for some i ∈ V . A graph is called weakly cyclic if every edge in the graph is
contained in at most one cycle. Vertices i, j ∈ V are said to be connected in G if there exists
a path between i and j in G. G is connected if any two vertices in V are connected. If G is
connected, an edge e ∈ E is called a bridge in G if the graph (V,E\{e}) is not connected.
2
A subgraph of G is a graph G′ = (V ′, E′) with V ′ ⊂ V , V ′ 6= ∅ and E′ is a subset of all
edges {i, j} ∈ E with i, j ∈ V ′, i 6= j.
2.2 Highway Games
A highway problem is defined as a tuple Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w). N = {1, ..., n} is
a nonempty, finite set of players and G = (V,E) is a connected graph. The graph G
determines the possibilities regarding the construction of the highway network. That is,
any constructed highway network has to be a subgraph of G. Note that G need not be the
complete graph, since the construction of some edges may be infeasible due to geographic or
socioeconomic reasons. For each player i ∈ N , si and ti are vertices in G and they are called
the connection vertices of i. The connection vertices of player i represent the locations (think
of entry and exit) that i has to establish a connection in between. Furthermore, w : E → R+
is called a cost function and associates to each edge, e ∈ E, the nonnegative cost w(e) of




In a highway problem, a coalition S of cooperating players will construct the cheapest
set of edges that connects the connection points of every member of S. Therefore, given a
highway problem Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w), the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is
defined by
cΓ(S) = minE′⊂E{w(E
′)|si and ti are connected in (V,E
′) for every i ∈ S} (1)
for all S ⊂ N . Clearly, (N, cΓ) is subadditive and monotonic.
Example 2.1 Let G = (V,E) be a cyclic graph with V = {v1, v2, v3, v4} and E =
{{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v3, v4}, {v4, v1}}. The construction costs of the edges are given by:
w({v1, v2}) = w({v2, v3}) = 2 and w({v3, v4}) = w({v4, v1}) = 3. Consider N = {1, 2, 3}
with s1 = v1, t1 = v3, s2 = v2, t2 = v3, s3 = v4, t3 = v1. The corresponding highway








t3 = = s1
= s2
t1 = = t2
s3 =
Figure 1: A highway problem with three players
Consider player 1. There are two paths in G between player 1’s connection vertices v1
and v3: {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}} and {{v1, v4}, {v4, v3}}. Since player 1 will not construct any
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superfluous edges, cΓ({1}) is the minimum of w({v1, v2})+w({v2, v3}) = 4 and w({v1, v4})+
w({v4, v3}) = 6, i.e., cΓ({1}) = 4.
Next, consider the coalition {1, 3}. Clearly, players 1 and 3 will construct the set of
edges {{v1, v4}, {v3, v4}}. Hence, cΓ({1, 3}) = 6.
The complete corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is given below:
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
cΓ(S) 4 2 3 4 6 5 7
Observe that this highway game is not concave:
cΓ({1, 2}) + cΓ({1, 3}) < cΓ({1}) + cΓ({1, 2, 3}).
⋄
Recall that when the underlying graph is a chain as it is the case for the highway
problems considered by Mosquera and Zarzuelo (2006), the induced highway games are
concave. In chain graphs, there exists only one path between the connection vertices of a
player. However, if there are multiple paths between the connection vertices of players in
the underlying graph, the above example illustrates that players can select different paths in
different coalitions and this may lead to the violation of concavity conditions of the induced
highway game.
3 HG-Concavity
In this section, we characterize HG-concave graphs. Recall that a graph G is HG-concave if
for every highway problem (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w), the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ)
is concave. Explicitly, we show that a graph is HG-concave if and only if it is weakly
triangular, i.e., every edge in the graph is contained in at most one cycle and every cycle
has three edges.
For this aim, we first show that every highway game on a triangle is concave.
Lemma 3.1 Let Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be a highway problem where G is a cyclic
graph with three edges. Then, the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is concave.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that si 6= ti for all i ∈ N . It can easily be
observed that
(i) for every coalition, it is optimal to construct either one edge in G or the two cheaper
edges in G;
(ii) for a coalition S ⊂ N , if it is optimal to construct one edge {u, v} in G, then {si, ti} =
{u, v} for every i ∈ S;
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(iii) for a coalition S ⊂ N , if it is optimal to construct the two cheaper edges in G, then
constructing the two cheaper edges is optimal for any superset of S, too.
Now, we will show that cΓ(S ∪ T ) + cΓ(S ∩ T ) ≤ cΓ(S) + cΓ(T ) for every S, T ⊂ N , i.e.,
that the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is concave. Take S, T ⊂ N and assume that
S ∩ T 6= ∅. For, if S ∩ T = ∅, then the inequality follows directly from the subadditivity of
(N, cΓ).
Firstly, (i) implies that, for any coalition K ⊂ N , c(K) is either equal to the sum of the
costs of the two cheaper edges in G or equal to the cost of one of the three edges in G.
If both cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) are equal to the sum of the costs of the two cheaper edges in
G, then the inequality follows from the monotonicity of cΓ and (iii). If only one of cΓ(S)
and cΓ(T ) is equal to the sum of the costs of the two cheaper edges in G and the other is
equal to the cost of one edge, say e, in G, then (iii) implies that cΓ(S ∪ T ) is equal to the
sum of the costs of the two cheaper edges in G and (ii) implies that cΓ(S ∩ T ) is also equal
to the cost of e. Hence, cΓ(S ∪ T ) + cΓ(S ∩ T ) = cΓ(S) + cΓ(T ).
Lastly, assume that cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) are equal to the cost of an edge in G. Then, since
S∩T 6= ∅, (ii) implies that cΓ(S) and cΓ(T ) have to be equal to the cost of the same edge in
G. Then, both cΓ(S ∪T ) and cΓ(S ∩T ) are equal to the cost of the same edge, too. Hence,
cΓ(S ∪ T ) + cΓ(S ∩ T ) = cΓ(S) + cΓ(T ). 
We now discuss some properties of weakly cyclic graphs. Let G = (V,E) be a weakly
cyclic graph. Clearly, each edge in G is either a bridge edge or belongs to a cycle in G. Let
C(G) denote the set of cycles in G and BE(G) denote the set of bridge edges in G. Observe
that every path in G which connects two vertices has to pass through (has a common edge
with) the same set of cycles and the same set of bridge edges in G. More specifically,
every path that connects the same two vertices, passes through the same cycles and the
same bridge edges but the edges followed in cycles may differ. Moreover, every path that
connects the same two vertices in G enter and leave a cycle that they pass through at the
same vertices.
Before presenting the main result of this section, we will show that for every highway
problem on a weakly cyclic graph, the corresponding highway game is equal to the sum
of specific sub-highway games on each cycle and on each bridge edge in the graph. These
sub-highway games are formally defined as follows.
Consider a highway problem Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) where G is a weakly cyclic
graph. Let C be a cycle in G. There exists a set of vertices VC = {v1, v2, ..., vk} ⊂ V
(k ≥ 3) such that C = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, ..., {vk , v1}}. Now, the sub-highway problem




i }}i∈N , w|C), where w|C is the
restriction of the cost function w to the edges in C. For each player i ∈ N , if the paths




i are the vertices in C at which the
paths connecting si and ti enter and leave C. If the paths connecting si and ti do not pass
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through C, then we set sCi = t
C
i = v1.
Next, let e = {u, v} be a bridge edge in G. Then, the sub-highway problem with respect
to e is defined by Γe = (N, ({u, v}, {e}), {{sei , t
e
i}}i∈N , w|{e}). Set s
e
i = u and t
e
i = v if the





Lemma 3.2 Let Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be a highway problem where G is a weakly
cyclic graph. Then, cΓ(S) =
∑
C∈C(G) cΓC (S) +
∑
e∈BE(G) cΓe(S) for every S ⊂ N .
We omit the proof of Lemma 3.2 since it is straightforward.
We are now ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1 A graph G is HG-concave if and only if it is weakly triangular.
Proof. We first show the if-part. Let G = (V,E) be a weakly triangular graph and consider
a highway problem Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w). We will show that the corresponding
highway game (N, cΓ) is concave.
We know by Lemma 3.2 that cΓ(S) =
∑
C∈C(G) cΓC (S) +
∑
e∈BE(G) cΓe(S) for every
S ⊂ N . By Lemma 3.1, we have that cΓC is concave for every triangle C ∈ C(G) and we
also know that highway games induced by chains are concave. In particular, cΓe is concave
for every e ∈ BE(G). We may conclude that cΓ is concave, since it is a non-negative linear
combination of concave games.
For the only-if part of the proof, choose a graph G = (V,E) that is not weakly trian-
gular. Now, we construct a player set N , connection vertices si, ti for each player i in N
and a cost function w such that the highway game corresponding to the highway problem
(N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) is not concave.
Since G is not weakly triangular, it contains a cycle with more than three edges. Let
(V ′, E′) be a subgraph of G corresponding to one such cycle C, i.e., V ′ = {v1, v2, ..., vk}
with k ≥ 4 and E′ = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, ..., {vk−1, vk}, {vk, v1}}. Let the player set be
N = {1, 2, 3} and let s1 = v1, t1 = v3, s2 = v2, t2 = v3 and s3 = vk, t3 = v1. Define the













2 if e ∈ {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}}
0 if e ∈ {{v3, v4}, ..., {vk−2, vk−1}}
3 if e ∈ {{vk, v1}, {vk, vk−1}}
100 if e 6∈ C
Figure 2 provides a figure depicting a part of the highway problem (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w).
Now, it can easily be shown that the highway game corresponding to the highway problem


















Figure 2: An auxiliary figure for the proof of Theorem 3.1
4 Balancedness of Highway Games on Weakly Cyclic Graphs
In this section, we determine sufficient conditions on a highway problem such that the
induced highway game is balanced. We first focus on highway problems on single cycles
and establish three sufficient conditions for the balancedness of the induced highway games.
Our first result states that if the number of players is less than or equal to three, then
highway games on a cycle are balanced. Consider a highway problem (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w),
where G is a cyclic graph. Observe that each player has two alternative paths that connect
his connection vertices in G. For player i, we denote an individually optimal path for i by
Pi and the alternative path by Qi. We first prove two preliminary results.
Lemma 4.1 Let the highway problem Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be such that G = (V,E)
is a cyclic graph and let j, k ∈ N . Then,
w(Pj ∩ Pk) ≤ w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)).
Proof. Pj can be partitioned into two sets of edges: Pj ∩ Pk and Pj\Pk. Similarly, Qj can














Figure 3: An auxiliary figure for the proof of Lemma 4.1
Since w(Pj) ≤ w(Qj),
w(Pj) = w(Pj ∩ Pk) + w(Pj\Pk) ≤ w(Pk\Pj) + w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)) = w(Qj). (2)
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Similarly, since w(Pk) ≤ w(Qk),
w(Pk) = w(Pj ∩ Pk) + w(Pk\Pj) ≤ w(Pj\Pk) + w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)) = w(Qk). (3)
By summing inequalities (2) and (3), one obtains
w(Pj ∩ Pk) ≤ w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)). (4)

Lemma 4.2 Let the highway problem Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be such that G = (V,E)
is a cyclic graph. Let j, k ∈ N (j 6= k) be such that w(Pj) ≤ w(Pk). Then,
cΓ({j, k}) = min{w(Pj ∪ Pk), w(Pj ∪ Qk)}.
Proof. Clearly, cΓ({j, k}) = min{w(Pj ∪ Pk), w(Pj ∪ Qk), w(Qj ∪ Pk), w(Qj ∪ Qk)}. We
will show that w(Pj ∪Qk) ≤ w(Qj ∪ Pk) and w(Pj ∪Pk) ≤ w(Qj ∪Qk). Note that Pj ∪Qk
can be partitioned into two sets Pj and Qk\Pj = E\(Pj ∪ Pk). Hence, w(Pj ∪ Qk) =
w(Pj) + w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)). Similarly, w(Qj ∪ Pk) = w(Pk) + w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)). We know that
w(Pj) ≤ w(Pk). Hence, w(Pj ∪ Qk) ≤ w(Qj ∪ Pk).
One can easily observe that w(Pj ∪ Pk) = w(E) − w(E\(Pj ∪ Pk)) and w(Qj ∪ Qk) =
w(E) − w(Pj ∩ Pk). Then, by Lemma 4.1, w(Pj ∪ Pk) ≤ w(Qj ∪ Qk). 
Proposition 4.1 Let Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) with |N | ≤ 3 be a highway problem such
that G is a cyclic graph. Then the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ) is balanced.
Proof. If |N | = 2, balancedness of (N, cΓ) follows from the subadditivity of the game. Set
N = {1, 2, 3}. Without loss of generality, assume that w(P1) ≤ w(P2) ≤ w(P3). We will
show that x = (cΓ({1}), cΓ({1, 2}) − cΓ({1}), cΓ(N) − cΓ({1, 2})) ∈ C(cΓ). Since (N, cΓ) is
subadditive, we only need prove the core inequality corresponding to the coalition {1, 3},
i.e., we need to prove that
cΓ(N) − cΓ({1, 2}) + cΓ({1}) ≤ cΓ({1, 3}). (5)
By Lemma 4.2, cΓ({1, 2}) is either equal to w(P1 ∪ Q2) or equal to w(P1 ∪ P2) and
cΓ({1, 3}) is either equal to w(P1 ∪ Q3) or equal to w(P1 ∪ P3). Firstly, assume that
cΓ({1, 2}) = w(P1 ∪ P2) and cΓ({1, 3}) = w(P1 ∪ P3). Then,
cΓ({1, 2}) + cΓ({1, 3}) − cΓ({1}) = w(P1 ∪ P2) + w(P1 ∪ P3) − w(P1)
= w(P1 ∪ P2) + w(P3\P1)
≥ w(P1 ∪ P2) + w(P3\(P1 ∪ P2))
= w(P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3) ≥ cΓ(N), (6)
where the second equality follows from the fact that P1 ∪ P3 can be partitioned into sets
P1 and P3\P1. Analogously, the remaining cases regarding the choice of cΓ({1, 2}) and
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cΓ({1, 3}) lead to the same result. 
In fact, in the proof of Proposition 4.1, we specify an allocation which always belongs to
the core of a three person highway game on a cyclic graph. This allocation corresponds to
a marginal of the highway game corresponding to an order in which the players are ordered
on the basis of individual costs. The following example illustrates that, for highway games
on cyclic graphs with more than three players, such a marginal need not be in the core.
Example 4.1 Consider the highway problem Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}













s4 = = t2
s1 =
s3 =
t4 = t1 = = s2
= t3
Figure 4: A highway problem with four players
The highway game (N, cΓ) corresponding to this problem is given by:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
cΓ(S) 8 11 12 13 19 18 13 15 18 20 21 20 21 20 23
Observe that cΓ(1) ≤ cΓ(2) ≤ cΓ(3) ≤ cΓ(4). Then the marginal corresponding to
the order (1234) in which players are ranked on the basis of their individual costs is x =
(8, 11, 2, 2). This marginal is not in C(cΓ), since x1 + x2 + x4 = 21 > 20 = cΓ({1, 2, 4}).
Note however that (N, cΓ) is balanced. For example, the cost allocation (6, 3, 12, 2) is in
C(cΓ). ⋄
In the following proposition we show that if, in a highway problem defined on a cyclic
graph, all players’ individually optimal paths are disjoint, then the corresponding highway
game is balanced.
Proposition 4.2 Let Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that G is a
cyclic graph. If Pi∩Pj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, then the corresponding highway game
(N, cΓ) is balanced.








w(∪i∈SPi) if n ∈ S and w(Pn) ≤ w(E\ ∪i∈S Pi)
w(Qn) if n ∈ S and w(E\ ∪i∈S Pi) ≤ w(Pn)
w(∪i∈SPi) if n 6∈ S.
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Now, it is readily seen that the allocation in which every player i 6= n pays cΓ({i}) =
w(Pi) and n pays w(Pn) if w(Pn) ≤ w(E\ ∪i∈S Pi) and w(E\ ∪i∈S Pi) if w(E\ ∪i∈S Pi) ≤
w(Pn), is a core allocation of (N, cΓ). 
In the following proposition we will prove that for a highway problem defined on a
cyclic graph, if each player wants to establish a connection with the same location, then the
corresponding highway game is balanced.
Proposition 4.3 Let Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that G is a
cyclic graph and si = sj for every i, j ∈ N . Then, the corresponding highway game (N, cΓ)
is balanced.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be a cyclic graph with V = {v0, v1, ..., vk} (k ≥ 2) and E =
{{v0, v1}, {v1, v2}, ..., {vk , v0}}. Assume that si = sj = v0 for every i, j ∈ N . Moreover, let
E∗ ⊂ E be a set of edges that is optimal to construct for N , i.e., cΓ(N) = w(E
∗). In the
following, we will assign each player i ∈ N the cost of a (possibly empty) subset E∗i of E
∗
and show that the corresponding cost allocation is in the core of (N, cΓ).
Firstly, let Nv = {i ∈ N |ti = v} for each v ∈ V . Now, consider a vertex vt ∈ V
with Nvt 6= ∅. Clearly, either the path {{vt, vt+1}, ..., {vk , v0}} is in E
∗ or the path
{{vt, vt−1}, ..., {v1, v0}} is in E
∗ so that vt and v0 are connected in (V,E
∗). Also E∗ can al-
ways be decomposed into two (possibly empty) disjoint paths {{v0, v1}, {v1, v2}..., {vq−1, vq}}
and {{v0, vk}, {vk, vk−1}, ..., {vr+1, vr}} for some vq ∈ V and vr ∈ {vq+1, ..., v0}.
We first consider the path {{v0, v1}, {v1, v2}..., {vq−1, vq}}. Let vt1 be the first vertex
in the sequence (v0, v1, ..., vq) such that N
vt1 6= ∅, i.e., Nvt1 6= ∅ and t1 ≤ t
′ for every t′ ∈
{0, 1, ..., q} such that Nvt′ 6= ∅. Pick a player i ∈ Nvt1 and set E∗i = {{v0, v1}, ..., {vt1−1, vt1}}.
Set E∗j = ∅ for every j ∈ N
vt1\{i}. If t1 = q, then we are done. Otherwise, let vt2 be the
first vertex in the sequence (vt1+1, ..., vq) such that N
vt2 6= ∅. Pick a player i ∈ Nvt2
and set E∗i = {{vt1 , vt1+1}, ..., {vt2−1, vt2}}. Set E
∗
j = ∅ for every j ∈ N
vt2\{i}. If
t2 = q, then we are done. Otherwise, one can repeat the procedure above until vq is
reached. Notice that the sets of edges assigned to players form a partition of the path
{{v0, v1}, {v1, v2}..., {vq−1, vq}}. Obviously, one can apply a similar procedure to allocate
the cost of the path {{v0, vk}, {vk, vk−1}, ..., {vr+1, vr}}.
We will now show that the cost allocation x = (w(E∗1 ), w(E
∗
2 ), ..., w(E
∗
n)) is in the core




i ) = w(E
∗) = cΓ(N) by construction.

















w(E∗i ) > cΓ(S) +
∑
i∈N\S
w(E∗i ) = w(ES) + w(E
∗
N\S). (7)
By the construction of E∗, for each i ∈ N\S, either there exists a path in E∗
N\S which
connects ti with v0 or there exists a path in E
∗
N\S which connects ti with a vertex v such
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that Nv ∩ S 6= ∅. Then, for every player i ∈ N , connection points si and ti are connected
via (E∗
N\S ∪ES) and hence, (7) contradicts with the optimality of the edge set E
∗ for N . 
We have obtained three sufficient conditions ensuring the balancedness of a highway
game on a cyclic graph. In the following theorem, we show that, if each sub-highway
problem with respect to a cycle (as defined in Section 3) in a weakly cyclic graph satisfies
one of the three sufficiency conditions, then the highway game induced by the weakly cyclic
graph is balanced.
Theorem 4.1 Let Γ = (N,G, {{si, ti}}i∈N , w) be a highway problem such that G is a weakly
cyclic graph. The highway game (N, cΓ) is balanced, if for every C ∈ C(G), the sub-




i }}i∈N , w|C) satisfies one of the following three
conditions:
(i) |N | ≤ 3.
(ii) PCi ∩ P
C
j = ∅ for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j.
(iii) sCi = s
C
j for every i, j ∈ N .
Proof. We know by propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 that if a sub-highway problem induced
by a cycle in G satisfies one of the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), then the corresponding
sub-highway game is balanced. Moreover, by Lemma 3.2, a highway game on a weakly
cyclic graph is equal to the sum of the sub-highway games with respect to each of its
cycles and with respect to each bridge edge in the graph, i.e., cΓ(S) =
∑
C∈C(G) cΓC (S) +
∑
e∈BE(G) cΓe(S) for every S ⊂ N . Pick y
C ∈ C(cΓC ) for each C ∈ C(G) and y
e ∈ C(cΓe)






e. Clearly, x ∈ C(cΓ). 
5 Concluding Remarks
Most of the current literature on the allocation of the construction costs of networks focuses
on minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems (cf. Granot and Huberman, 1981). These
problems consider a group of players, each of whom has to be connected to a source, either
directly or via other players. The main difference between highway problems and mcst
problems is that, in a highway problem, there is no particular vertex every player has to
be connected to. A difference less important is that usually, in mcst problems, a coalition
S is not allowed to use vertices other than the vertices of S and the source. Indeed, if this
restriction is relaxed, then the corresponding relaxed mcst game is a special type of highway
game.
Moreover, for complete graphs, highway problems are related to minimum cost forest
(mcf) problems introduced by Kuipers (1997). Mcf problems are generalizations of mcst
problems which allow for more than one source, where each source offers a different type
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of service and each customer has to be connected with a nonempty subset of the available
sources. Kuipers (1997) establishes sufficient conditions for the balancedness of the corre-
sponding mcf games. Highway games on complete graphs form a subclass of the class of
mcf games. As Kuipers (1997) provides an example of a three person mcf problem, in which
every player has to be connected to exactly one source, that leads to a non-balanced game,
it follows that a three person highway game on a complete graph need not be balanced.
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